



LIBYA PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT FOR STABILITY (PSES)

EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS & FINAL REPORT

SEPTEMBER 2016 – DECEMBER 2018

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PSES EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS & FINAL REPORT

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ACRONYMS

ADS: Automated Directives System
AIDAR: USAID Acquisitions Regulation
AMEP/AMELP: Activity Monitoring and (Learning) Evaluation Plan
BAA: Broad Agency Announcement
CCN: Cooperating Country National
CE: Categorical Exclusion
CEO: Community Engagement Officer
CEPPS: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CO: Contracting Officer
COR: Contracting Officer's Representative
DAI: DAI Global LLC
DDL: Development Data Library
DDR: Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DEC: Development Experience Clearinghouse
DRG: Democracy, Rights and Governance
DSSR: Department of State Standardized Regulations
GCCSN: Ghadames Center for Children with Special Needs
GNC: General National Congress
GOL: Government of Libya
IC: Independent Consultant
IR: Intermediate Result
KIIs: Key Informant Interviews
LCB: Libya Consensus Building
LEBS: Libya Elections and Governance Support
LOE: Level of Effort
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NGO: Non-Government Organization
PITT: Performance Indicator Tracking Table
PIV: Personal Identity Verification
PMEP: Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan

PSES: Private-Sector Engagement for Stability

STTA: Short-Term Technical Assistance

TCN: Third Country National

UMCS: Um Momineen Civil Society

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Launched under the aegis of a Broad Agency Announcement, PSES began through a co-creation process including USAID/Washington, the USAID Libya Engagement Office (LEO), and DAI. All parties sought to examine the validity of the following theory of change:

*If private sector actors are able and willing to collaborate across conflict lines in local communities to achieve common economic interests, **then** these private sector initiatives will help build economic interdependence and prosperity, **thereby** reducing conflict and building trust.*

This simple statement generated a series of ambitious hypotheses about the process and expected results from the project's work. Only one of these, the first and most basic, seemed clearly validated by PSES' work, though for the others, PSES collected anecdotal evidence to show their potential validity. PSES did not have sufficient time or data to fully validate all the hypotheses, but this report will detail key findings and lessons learned that could be relevant to future USAID programming

Over its 27-month span and [REDACTED], PSES went through four phases:

- 1) **Planning** – selection of the five communities in which PSES worked and staffing selection
- 2) **Qualitative and Quantitative Research** - informative research on the selected communities' conflict dynamics, private sector actors, and general community attitudes toward both
- 3) **Private Sector Pilot Activities** – small scale activities in each of the five communities that incentivized the selected private sector partners to work across conflict lines in the given community
- 4) **Project Analysis** – interviewing, surveying, and analysis of direct and indirect activity beneficiaries to determine activity impact on conflict dynamics and attitude.

USAID launched PSES as a research project, with the mission of learning as much as possible about the conflicts in our selected communities and about the communities' attitudes toward those conflicts. From the inception of the project, therefore, PSES identified that conflict dynamics were vastly different in every community in Libya and could significantly impact activity results. For this reason, PSES selected five communities to work in that had varying types of conflict. The selected communities and associated conflict dynamics were characterized as follows:

- 1) **Ghadames:** Ethnic - Ghadamsiya Arabs/Amazigh versus Tuareg; latent conflict because communities separated geographically;
- 2) **Bani Walid:** Ideological; historic hostility between pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi residents (February versus September);
- 3) **Kufra:** Arab-African ethnic conflict; Zway Arab versus Tebu; active hostilities with fighting, kidnapping
- 4) **Sebha:** Tribal; Awlad Suleiman versus Gadadfa; intermittent active fighting and kidnapping, concentrated in specific parts of the city

- 5) **Benghazi:** Religious; sectarian; conflict became static by the time PSES work began, but the ruling coalition started enforcing strict governance

Although the small scale and brief duration of PSES means that conclusions from the project's research and implementation work are only indicative of the potential for larger scale interventions using the PSES methodology, PSES found that working with the private sector was a useful approach in all five communities, regardless of the vastly different conflict dynamics. If scaled up, the private sector led approach could bring greater positive results and serve as a unique approach to stability programming in Libya moving forward. This report will highlight key findings and recommendations when working in Libya, and specifically when considering a private sector led approach in Libya.

LESSONS LEARNED

Over the life of the project, PSES came up with the following key lessons learned about programming and operating in Libya:

- The conflict in Libya differs from what USAID and other donors have encountered in other insecure states as they are unclear and often do not have fixed groups/combatants. In Afghanistan, for example, two sides are fighting a war, though the combatants are often hard to distinguish. In Libya, however, the situation often approaches a Hobbesian 'war of all against all;' militias wax and wane in strength and activity, and even the two main contestants for national power (GNA and LNA) are in constant contact and cooperate on many fronts while competing on others. In some communities, the local conflict has little to do with national level politics, and the absence of a controlling national authority permits the conflicts to thrive. This makes both planning and executing projects on the ground more difficult than in other countries.
- Women and women's enterprises were very open to undertaking programs with support from PSES that would expand their reach and offer opportunities for competing groups to come together. The dental clinic in Dirj and the training centers in Bani Walid, Sebha, and Benghazi were all owned and managed by women who welcomed the chance to bring together members of tribal, political, or ethnic groups that had been in conflict in the community. This openness contrasted with the idea that because Libya is an Arab country, women's roles are traditionally limited and will not have an impact. Furthermore, the stereotypical 'women's jobs' – nursing and teaching— appealed to many women, but by no means did women seem to feel limited to opportunities in those fields.
- The most successful partnerships were with medical practices and training firms—the most in-demand and far reaching services in those communities that could therefore have the greatest sustainability and impact. The five PSES Community Engagement Officers (CEOs) sought out potential private sector partners with on-going enterprises or NGOs that could ensure the sustainability of the expansion or innovation which we would agree to support. PSES avoided start-ups and rejected expressions of interest from enterprises that could not offer existing activities and infrastructure on which we could build our joint programs to promote stabilization.

PSES also avoided retail/trading firms due to potential for illicit trade. When discussing which partners could have the largest impact, the CEOs mostly selected training firms and medical practices. These enterprises charged fees for their services, possessed the physical infrastructure needed to bring together members of competing communities and provided the significant cost share that PSES required since PSES strictly gave relatively small material contributions.

- Conflict dynamics cannot be generalized when programming in Libya; they are extremely specific to communities and demand locally-based staff that know how to navigate the community's complexities. PSES selected the communities in which it would implement activities to ensure geographic coverage (East, West, and South Libya) and a variety of conflict types to assess whether the private sector impact could vary by conflict dynamic. Establishing the context for stabilization and ensuring real economic and social connections to the institutions and communities is as or more important than explicit instructions to bring about real inter-community interaction and conflict mitigation. This led to PSES prioritizing finding staff that knew the community inside and out rather than focusing on finding staff that knew USAID programming inside and out.
- Cash payments to suppliers are often the only option in Libya and require above-average time for procurements. Most reporting on Libya cites the almost non-functional Libyan banking system and the lack of cash in the economy as major constraints to business development as well as to family life. US federal procurement regulations were challenging to balance as suppliers often insisted on immediate cash payments for the limited supplies of goods they were able to import. Select imports were also often delayed as vendors tried to secure Letters of Credit. For future programming, teams should allow above-average time to locate, procure, and deliver required goods and allocate time, staff, and resources to train in-country teams on correct procedures for transparent and fair procurement of goods. PSES approached this by holding operational and procurement sessions at both team-wide Programmatic Pause meetings held in Tunisia. Despite this, PSES found that constant communication of procurement regulations was necessary as well.
- Informal meetings and gatherings can serve as effective ways to get opposing sides of the conflict together. PSES viewed informal meetings as more effective than formal workshops or trainings. Several PSES partners, particularly in Bani Walid and Ghadames/Awal/Dirj, noted that good relations among opposing parties in latent or even active conflicts were more easily and organically established by grouping people together informally in courses, medical waiting rooms, or coffee shops, rather than through training or lectures on peace-building and stabilization.
- When conducting intensive research, streamline data collection as much as possible and have a defined audience for the research. PSES engaged two subcontractors during its research phase: one that focused on qualitative research and another that focused on quantitative. PSES believes that having one organization lead both efforts would have led to more synthesized research results. To collate the separate research efforts, PSES wrote 10-12-page summary reports. PSES found that the research scope of work should have been less ambitious from the start and the audience for the research and mechanism for dissemination should have been clearly defined throughout.

- Quick impact activities were perceived as more successful than slower moving undertakings. PSES implementation included quick impact activities (e.g. medical supplies delivered to clinics in Ghadames/Awal/Dirj) and longer-term activities (e.g. the agricultural program in Kufra). Once beneficiary relationships had been established, it was found that the quick impact activities were perceived as the most successful.
- Strong relationships with key stakeholders in the community are critical to expanding project presence or beginning activity implementation. PSES spent a significant amount of time explaining the project to Municipal Councils, Chambers of Commerce and assemblies of elders, both formal and informal. Once PSES had their approval, it moved forward contacting partners and planning implementation. As the project concept was based on private sector participation, PSES did not request or expect any material contribution from these bodies but needed them to know of PSES' presence and overall goal in the community. The private sector can act and have a positive impact on stabilization, but any private sector led activity requires at least tacit support from local government and tribal governance structures.
- The private sector in Libya is comprised of many small business and privately run non-governmental organizations that appear ready to work across conflict lines. This is despite research findings that showed businesses would avoid investing in communities if the conflict was a threat to the business. The nuances and further considerations surrounding this specific point are detailed in the following section.

PSES HYPOTHESES

Although the project initially sought to examine the validity of the previously stated simple theory of change, it generated seven very ambitious hypotheses about the expected results from the project's work. Upon reflection and with the benefit of hindsight, PSES should have limited its aims to supporting the simple, yet important, theory of change. Only one of the seven hypotheses, the most important and most basic, seemed clearly validated by PSES' work. Although PSES collected anecdotal evidence for the other six hypotheses, PSES determined that they require a much larger program of work in many more communities, with differing types of conflicts.

The more variation incorporated into hypotheses, for example see below, hypotheses 2, 5 and 6, the larger the sample size needed to have sufficient results to support or contradict them. Even those hypotheses with simple comparisons, see hypotheses 3, 4 and 7, require a sample larger than six to make definitive conclusions concerning validity. Below is a review of each hypothesis.

Hypothesis #1 – Private sector actors who undertake actions across conflict lines will help reduce conflict and build trust.

PSES can assert with a high level of confidence that the activities undertaken in Phase Three support this hypothesis. This is especially true for Bani Walid, Ghadames-Awal-Dirj and Sebha, the three communities in which PSES was able to complete Phase Three activities.

Bani Walid: The trainees, management, and staff the training center noted that the interaction across conflict lines that occurred during the PSES-supported courses, built trust between the two communities. More than 90 percent of respondents in the Phase Four data collection effort said that they interacted with the other side of the conflict. A large majority of the respondents also said that they had become comfortable or somewhat comfortable with these interactions which PSES views as an indication that the private sector can be a good starting point to get opposing groups together that would not normally interact with each other.

Ghadames/Awal/Dirj: The Ghadames 1 private sector cross conflict activity in Ghadames – Awal strongly supports this hypothesis. The two clinics, a medical clinic in Ghadames and a dental clinic in Dirj, and the referral network they established created a platform for the Amazigh and Tuareg to sit together in a neutral place. At first the Tuareg who traveled to Ghadames to seek medical care were fearful. One patient noted that the fear evaporated as they entered the clinic because “they are welcomed with a smile and friendly attitude ... they leave the clinic satisfied and happy.” The head of a local NGO noted with enthusiasm:

“...it (PSES Ghadames Activity One) helped lower the high tensions. Because when we sit down on chairs next to each other, we would have to at least say ‘al salam alaikum’ to one another. I am obliged to welcome you, I am obliged to shake your hand. So these are things/results that you can touch, that there are relationships that were restored thanks to these (PSES) efforts. If it wasn't for the existence of that equipment, available for everyone, at such prices, they wouldn't have met in one place.”

Over 75 percent of the respondents to the Ghadames Phase Four data collection effort said that their opinion of the opposing side of the conflict changed due to the PSES activity.

The results of the second Ghadames activity support this hypothesis equally strongly. The results showed that the two sides came to the training for special needs children. The objective of providing special needs children with the opportunity to lead fuller lives outweighed any trepidation that the two sides may have initially felt towards the other. In doing so, the two sides saw their common humanity; relationships across conflict lines flourished. Since the end of the training, both beneficiaries and their families increased the number of visits to each other's towns. They started organizing activities to bring the children together, which consequently brings the parents together. Those activities became highly publicized on social media attracting positive reactions from the rest of the different societies.

In addition, the second Ghadames activity created "side beneficiaries". These were the husbands or brothers of the trainees who spent days at a time in cafes, visiting friends, shopping, and with their families staying in hotels, if they came from far out of town. This meant that they interacted in the wider society of Ghadames and Dirj, improving their comfort level with the opposite side of the conflict.

Sebha: The results from Sebha also emphatically support this hypothesis. The training courses provided by the PSES partner were for women in sweets making and dress making. The courses, offered in a neutral neighborhood of Sebha, brought together the Awlad Suleiman, Gadadfa, and Tebu for several weeks of courses. This was a tribal conflict, which pitted the tribe of Colonel Gadhafi against the Awlad Suleiman.

The trainees and management said that the courses helped form relationships between the trainers and trainees which led to "harmony between them." One trainee noted that the impact of the courses was to "convert the conflict from a 'curse' to a 'blessing'" as it led to the reunification of members of the Awlad Suleiman, Gadadfa and Tebu tribes. Trainees generally expressed renewed comfort in dealing with members of other communities after their positive experience being students alongside of each other. According to one of them "we all live in the same city, under the same conditions, and suffer from the same things."

Kufra and Benghazi: It is premature to determine that the results from these final two communities support this hypothesis. The activities in both communities did not work long enough to provide sufficient evidence. Yet, there is anecdotal information that the activities had a positive effect on the stability.

In Kufra, the small agricultural project was beset with security problems that prevented the full implementation of the activity. Originally, the farm owner intended to hire both Tebu and Zway workers for farm development and for cultivation activities. The threat of kidnapping or worse often stopped the Tebu from traveling to the farm. Initially, some Tebu workers joined the Zway on the farm. These interactions were welcomed by both parties, but unfortunately, there were not enough such interactions for proper data collection to determine results. Since the end of Phase Three, the farm owner noted his intention to hire Tebu workers in the future. He also granted some of the vegetables produced on the farm to his Tebu workers and their families.

In Benghazi, delays in the commencement of the project also led to a scaling back of the activity. The NGO partner in Benghazi welcomed all citizens of the region to participate in its activities, regardless of

political or religious affiliation. In fact, the training center management does not normally inquire or otherwise seek to find out either the neighborhoods in which the trainees live or their potential affiliations. Working with an organization that is neutral and does not take sides in the complex conflict that beset Benghazi is likely to have a positive impact on stability.

Hypothesis #2 – The success of private sector interventions at helping reduce conflict and build trust will vary with the capacity and functionality of the authorities in providing services.

This hypothesis calls for a comparison of communities with varying levels of capacity and functionality in the provision of services. While Phase Two research collected data on provision of services, there was little distinction among the communities. Further, to make a definitive statement to support or not this hypothesis, the Phase Three activity design would have required many more communities to make a legitimate and defensible comparison.

Hypothesis #3 – Women will be more willing to undertake crossline private sector interventions than men will.

PSES activities in Bani Walid, Sebha, and Benghazi focused either primarily or solely on women, and particularly on training women to seek employment or start businesses in the post-revolution economic circumstances in Libya. Only in Kufra were there no women involved in the Phase Three activity. PSES found in Phase Three that women are willing to accept new roles in society and in the economy, a finding that differed from the Phase Two findings regarding the role of women in Libya. The Phase Three findings also showed that greater participation by women in society and the economy can contribute to stability. But, it is impossible to aver that they are *more* willing than men because men too were eager to participate. Phase Three showed that the engagement of both genders has a positive effect on stability.

Hypothesis #4 – Private sector interventions will be more successful at helping to reduce conflict and build trust when the conflict is predominantly motivated by economic concerns.

Using the private sector to reduce conflict and build trust is almost by definition based on economic concerns. However, one could claim that the success attributed to the Ghadames/Awal Phase Three work was not based on economic concerns, rather it was based on medical concerns or the concerns for the needs of special children. Instead, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the private sector interventions are helpful if motivated by *compelling* concerns. The training courses offered in Bani Walid and Sebha aimed at preparing participants for jobs (e.g. as nurses or in IT) or for starting their own businesses (e.g. sewing, knitting, or sweets making). Participants had to pay to take the courses, showing their readiness to make an investment in potential future economic possibilities. PSES felt that this hypothesis might be valid and testable but would require further research.

Hypothesis #5 – The success of private sector interventions at helping to reduce conflict and build trust will vary with the type of community engaged, including variables such as: (1) population; (2) the degree of stability in the community; (3) the degree of community cohesiveness; (4) the ripeness of the conflict; and (5) leadership type.

The design and size of the Phase Three set of activities makes it impossible to evaluate this hypothesis. There was insufficient variation among the small set of communities to support or contradict this hypothesis.

Hypothesis #6 – The success of private sector interventions at helping to reduce conflict and build trust will vary with the type of actors engaged, including variables such as:

(1) the source of their income; (2) the sector in which they operate; (3) the degree of their ties to government; (4) the degree of their ties to armed actors; (5) the balance of participation between conflicting communities; (6) the proportion of youth participation.

Like Hypothesis #5, the scope of PSES was not sufficiently large to consider the variables noted in this hypothesis.

Hypothesis #7 – Private sector interventions that succeed in helping to reduce conflict and build trust will lead to similarly improved outcomes in neighboring communities that share economic ties.

PSES has anecdotal evidence from Ghadames/Awal/Dirj, especially the second activity to support this hypothesis. The second Ghadames/Awal/Dirj activity provided benefits to a much larger area than Ghadames/Awal/Dirj. Families with special needs children from as far as 200 kilometers away came to obtain training for their children. This meant that people who had been separated by distance and conflict were brought together in this neutral setting. The first Ghadames/Awal/Dirj activity also brought in distant families who heard about the modern medical equipment provided by PSES.

This anecdotal evidence is important, but it is only one case. PSES thus cannot make a definitive statement about this hypothesis.

GHADAMES ACTIVITY ONE

The conflict in Ghadames/Awal was primarily ethnic. The Tuareg people, who lived side by side with the Ghadamsiya in Ghadames fled the city with the onset of the 2011 revolution against the Gaddafi regime. Many of them settled in a barren area known as Awal, and others moved to Dirj, a city about 100 kilometers from Ghadames. The Phase Two findings indicated that the conflict between the opposing sides, Tuareg and Ghadamsiya, had calmed. The calm was largely because the two sides of the conflict had no chance to interact. Physical separation made it impossible for the two sides to continue an active conflict. Many on both sides of the conflict felt that separation was the only solution to the conflict. The Tuareg showed little or no interest in moving back to Ghadames, while the Ghadamsiya had little interest to welcome them back.

PSES evaluated this superficial separation as an indication that the conflict was ripe, that is ready, for change. PSES chose to attempt to change this dynamic by focusing on an activity that provides cross-conflict medical services to the populations of Ghadames/Awal/Dirj. The rationale for this choice is that public sector medical and dental services in Ghadames had completely broken down. With the critical nature of fulfilling basic medical needs, both sides of the conflict in Ghadames/Awal expressed a willingness to cooperate across conflict lines if it meant improved healthcare for all. The PSES activity in this area was designed to create space for members of the opposing communities to come together, based on common needs, in a politically neutral space, within the private sector.

PSES selected two partners willing to work with both Ghadamsiya and Tuareg population groups, as well as each other, to improve services offered in the region. Both partners are certified private-sector medical professionals and their clinics have the appropriate certification and legal status, which ensures sustainability and provides legitimacy to the activity. The two partners were a certified medical doctor

that owns al-Shifaa Clinic in Ghadames and a certified Tuareg dentist who owns al-Masarra Clinic in Dirj (though PSES worked closest with a female dentist at this clinic) who established a referral network between them to encourage cross-population of the clinics.

With the provision of modern medical equipment such as an x-ray and ultrasound, clinic renovation, and consumable medical supplies, the al-Masarra clinic treated a total of 2,904 patients over 10 months. Before the PSES activity, most of the patients in the two clinics were from the neighboring areas. The establishment of the referral network between the two clinics, a network that is blind to the conflict line, plus the additional supplies and equipment allowed the clinics to treat more patients, and patients of all income levels, many of whom came from other communities.

As detailed below, PSES supported al-Masarra Clinic in Dirj to see 2,470 patients and al-Shifaa Clinic in Ghadames to see 434 patients for a total of 2,904 patients seen from December 2017 through September 2018. Of the total patients seen, 45% of them were Tuareg, 17% of them for Ghadamsiya, and 38% of them had other affiliations. There was a 41% men to 59% women breakdown.


Ghadames/Awal/Dirj Activity 1 Phase Three Engagement							
Clinic Name	Total Patients	Number of Tuareg	Number of Ghadamsiya	Number of Other	Number of Men Women		
1 Al-Masarra (Dirj)	2470	1216	232	1022	1041	1429	
2 Al-Shifaa (Ghadames)	434	78	268	88	149	285	
TOTAL	2904	1294	500	1110	1190	1714	

- December 2017 through September 2018, with support from PSES, al-Masarra dental clinic in Dirj has treated 2,470 patients, 247 percent above the overall target of 990. The heaviest months were January (359 patients), February (445), March (433) and April (329).
- In terms of ethnicity, Tuaregs accounted for 49 percent of the total (1216 patients), Ghadamsiya for nine percent (232 patients), and ‘Others’ for 41 percent (1022 patients).
- In terms of gender, 58 percent of patients were female (1429) and 42 percent were male (1041) at the al-Masarra clinic.
- Al-Masarra personnel made four visits per month to the Tuareg settlement of Awal, as planned, except in February and June, when only three visits took place.
- Al-Masarra was not able to refer as many Tuareg patients to al-Shifa clinic in Ghadames town as planned (47 against a target of about 50). However, Al-Shifaa personnel made one visit per month to Awal.
- From July 2018 to September 2018, with support from PSES, al-Shifa dental clinic in Ghadames treated 434 patients, exceeding the overall target of 100. The heaviest month was July with 185 patients.
- In terms of ethnicity, Tuaregs accounted for 18 percent of the total (78 patients), Ghadamsiya for 62 percent (268 patients), and ‘Others’ for 20 percent (88 patients).
- In terms of gender, 66 percent of patients were female (285) and 34 percent were male (149) at the al-Shifaa clinic.

PHASE FOUR RESULTS

The medical clinic's initial clientele and staff were mostly Amazigh and Arab, but through this activity it expanded to include Tuaregs. The head doctor also engaged two certified Tuareg nurses to ensure that Tuareg clients feel at ease in using his office's services. Similarly, a certified Tuareg dentist in Dirj engaged one Amazigh/Arab staff member to encourage additional clients for her practice.

The results from the Ghadames 1 activity in terms of promotion of stability are very encouraging. In surveys and focus groups, respondents reported that the support provided to both clinics resulted in a significant increase in number of patients who came from different communities and tribes. The repeated contact between these different communities in the clinic waiting rooms led to respondents reporting an overall easing of fear of the other side.



Both partners from this activity confirmed that the support provided by PSES helped increase the capacity of their clinics, and the overall quality of the services delivered.


“After the organization provided me with the three devices, we started getting more of a turnout of people seeking help. They increased much more than before I had the devices.” - The partner from al-Masara clinic in Dirj.

“They provided us with equipment and materials, and we provided our services as a clinic and both worked in the favor of the local community. We provided some of the services for free, services that could cost hundreds of dinars in Tripoli for instance.” The partner from al-Shifaa clinic in Ghadames.

Because certain medical equipment, the ultrasound for example, was not available elsewhere in the region, word spread very quickly that these diagnostic machines were available, which consequently led to the increase of patients. Prior to the procurement of this equipment, patients used to travel 650km to get to the capital, Tripoli, bearing the burden of insecure road travel, and the considerable expenses of the journey.

As mentioned above, before PSES support, patients of both clinics were from nearby areas. The referral services and the new equipment meant that patients now come from different communities and tribes. At first, the patients who came from other communities were concerned about the interaction with the opposing side of the conflict. The fear or tension that they seem to have felt faded through interaction with the medical staff and with the other patients at the clinic.

The fear that patients felt was especially apparent with the Tuareg who were treated in Ghadames. The Tuareg respondents, most of whom had fled Ghadames during the revolution, said that they entered the



Ghadames clinic with some trepidation, but, “then they are welcomed with a smile and friendly attitude ... they leave the clinic satisfied and happy.” Over 75 percent of the respondents said that the experience at the clinic changed their opinion of the opposing side. And about the same number of respondents said that they were comfortable receiving treatment from members of the opposing community.

The aim of the initial design of this activity was to work through the private sector to help bring the two targeted parties to the conflict together, and ultimately increase interaction between them; but the results show that it has succeeded in doing more than that. It created an unusual pull factor for indirect beneficiaries from the wider region.

“We barely get any rest. There is an immense pressure because of the number of people who come from all over the place to get checked and get treatment,” the doctor explained.


Hence, the waiting rooms of both clinics are packed with patients from a mixed bag of the various ethnic identities of the southern western region, including the two communities of the conflict. This provided an indirect platform for interaction between all of those communities. While waiting for their turn, people are “obliged” to interact and be nice to one another.

The head of a civil society association in Ghadames, who has been following the project’s progress since the beginning remarked:

“What I’m trying to say is that it helped lower the high tensions. Because when we sit down on chairs next to each other, we would have to at least say ‘al salam alaikum’ to one another other. I am obliged to welcome you, I am obliged to shake your hand. So, these are things/results that you can touch, that there are relationships that were restored thanks to these (PSES) efforts. If it

wasn't for the existence of that equipment, available for everyone, at such prices, they wouldn't have met in one place.”¹


Overall, the respondents said that the clinics “contributed greatly to the establishment of security and stability among all communities.” This contribution was achieved because it brought together people to one place for a common purpose. “It also contributed to establishing the rules of community peace and that is to bring everyone under one umbrella without distinctions or bias”, one respondent noted.



Over 75 percent of the respondents said that the experience at the clinic changed their opinion of the opposing side. About the same number of respondents said that they were comfortable receiving treatment from members of the opposing community. The PSES activity also highlighted the importance of women in the healthcare sector. In this regard, women played an integral role in contributing to stability in the area.

As mentioned earlier, the ripeness of the conflict meant that both communities are beyond seeking revenge or targeting one another. The only thing lacking was a small push, or rather an incentive, to encourage interaction between the two; that could have only happened if the displaced Tuareg in both Dirj and Awal found a reason to visit Ghadames and had faith that it is safe to do so. The clinic did indeed provide both the safe space and the incentive for the Tuareg to visit, and ultimately increased interaction between the two communities.

¹This references the modern medical machinery PSES procured for both clinics that allowed for more rapid and accurate diagnosis of patients moving forward. Both clinics invested their own money to ensure proper storage rooms for the equipment were created prior to the equipment arrival and both clinics had staff trained by the equipment providers.



Moreover, the doctors themselves were encouraged to do field visits to patients who couldn't come visit them. The dentist has procured a portable device which allows her to do her work in Awal, for instance. The doctor in Ghadames also does occasional field visits to Dirj and Awal. He explained:

“So, do you think that I would do that and go to host sessions in Dirj and Awal If I didn't feel safe? This is one of the things that your organization (PSES) helped us out here with, it made us feel easy about visiting one another.”

GHADAMES ACTIVITY TWO

The PSES partner in the second Ghadames activity was the Ghadames Center for Children with Special Needs (GCCSN). The center provides educational activities and support to children with special needs, with a focus on autism. It has two centers, one in Ghadames and a second smaller center in Dirj. The goal of this activity is to support GCCSN with needed upgrades and expansion to its two centers to allow the organization to accommodate more children and therefore have a greater impact on the two communities. This was done through the provision of rehabilitation materials and through a series of training of trainers' courses. The training of trainers focused on methodologies and curricula known as Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related Communication Handicapped Children (TEACHC) and Assessment of Basic Language and Learning Skills (ABLSS). With this activity, children and families had several opportunities to cross conflict lines in a safe environment.

Because this activity began in the summer of 2018, only a few months before the end of PSES, there was insufficient data generated by the activity to warrant a larger scale survey and information gathering effort. Thus, the Phase Four assessment was conducted through telephone interviews of key informants, trainees, and some family members of the children who received assistance.

PHASE FOUR RESULTS

Despite the limited time spent on this activity, it met the objectives it was designed to achieve. This center is a 'private' non-profit endeavor, and a much needed one. According to, the partner at GCCSN, the

200km radius within which the GCCSN operates has a population of 14 to 15 thousand people, and 300 to 400 of the children living there have disabilities of all sorts, including physical and mental. Not only was the upgrade important to build the capacity of GCCSN, but also to help build the capacity of those interested in providing similar services in areas falling within the 200 km radius: Awal, Dirj and even Senaun.

The training targeted 30 participants, some of whom are from Ghadames, but the rest were teachers who were already focused on this field from Dirj, and Senaun, which is 200 km away from Ghadames.

“The reason why we targeted those faraway areas is to start building their local capacity, so they can start their own centers, instead of having to drive the 200-300 kms to get services here in Ghadames.” The partner added that “building the human capacity is the most important of them (objectives) all.”

Like the first Ghadames activity, this activity provided both the space and the common interest for people from all communities to interact with one another. The 8-day training meant that 30 trainees (and additional families bringing their children) mixed for those full days. “The results are pretty good,” said a doctor from Dirj, who also happens to be a mother of a special needs son, “many kids have benefited from us training them on basic things, and families were happy.”

Additionally, the training touched indirect beneficiaries, the male companions of the female trainees targeted by this activity. For those coming from Dirj/Awal, male companions were the ones who drove them back and forth to the training. During the hours of the training, the male companions remained in Ghadames, which meant that they inevitably interacted in the city beyond the walls of the training center. According to the doctor’s husband, some spent the day with their relatives, some were doing separate activities around the city, and or around the center itself, which provided opportunities to once again mix with the Ghadamsiya population that they were normally separate from.

As for the participants from the town of Senaun, it was not practical to drive 400 km daily to participate in the training, which meant they spent the full 8 days in the city of Ghadames. This also meant that the entire family, trainees, their husband and children had full interactions with residents of the city - something which didn't happen often prior to the training.

Prior to the training, people from Senaun had minimum contact with people in Ghadames. Even when they visited Ghadames, they would be visiting the clinics or to do some shopping, then leave. But during the training, one participant noted that “there definitely was an increase of interactions, especially for those coming from Senaun.”

While the previous activity, as a business venture, contributed to the creation of a pull factor towards Ghadames, the different nature of this activity produced a similar yet a different result: It has encouraged the building of more personal ties between participants of this training, and their families, leading to a creation of a special community that revolves around the special needs children. Since the end of the training, both beneficiaries and their families increased the number of visits to each other’s towns. They have started organizing activities to bring the children together, which consequently bring the parents together. Those activities became highly publicized on social media attracting positive reactions.

When PSES started, the conflict between Ghadames and Awal was at the exact stage where violence was no longer considered. Both communities were already moving on and seeking a peaceful life away from each other in towns that are kilometers apart. Even those in Ghadames who lost relatives during the

conflict and were previously determined to seek revenge on the Tuareg component have since calmed down. Though they still refuse to interact with the Tuareg, they have made promises not to target nor harass Tuareg who return or visit Ghadames.

“I say that as a member of reconciliation committees that worked on this, and I can say with a certainty that we are past those issues. We don't have a single case of retaliation, or kidnap that is motivated by the conflict. Again, I am talking about the year and a half, to two years behind, we don't have a single case of retaliation recorded,” the partner explained.

But the halt in violence wasn't enough for those communities to completely reconcile their differences. PSES came at the right time to provide the tools and incentives for the next step of reconciliation and encourage interactions between the two communities. Both communities understand the need for stability to be able to focus on addressing more pressing needs, but both lack the capacity to do so.

Choosing the kind of activities which targeted those exact needs not only ensured the delivery of those services, but also the potential continuity of the projects long after PSES ended. It is safe to conclude that the two activities in Ghadames-Awal were successful. The activities designed for this area have proven to be a perfect match to the needs of the two opposing communities, something which ensured that the interaction between the two significantly increased over the course of the two activities.

BANI WALID

The conflict in Bani Walid is primarily political. The opposing sides are the Septembrists, who supported the Gadhafi regime versus the Februarists, who supported the anti-Gadhafi revolution. The Septembrists were Bani Walid residents who received support from Gadhafi, unlike the Februarists who were not favored by the former regime. Both the Februarists and the Septembrists are Arabs of the same tribe. The factor that differentiates them, and results in conflict, is political. In 2017 and 2018, the conflict in Bani Walid was tepid. That is, it was not a hot conflict, but there remained significant antipathy on behalf of one side against the other.



After PSES Phase Two, the project considered several possible activities with several different entities. PSES chose to work with Al Hanaya Center, a women-owned private company aimed at providing conflict-neutral services to Bani Walid residents. The Center offers courses to men, women and children on a variety of topics. Most courses are geared to developing skills to prepare for employment in such areas as IT, dress design, sewing, and English. Of interest, are the courses that Al Hanaya provides in nursing. Graduates of Al-Hanaya's nursing courses are certified to work in both private and public medical facilities. The Center also provides psychosocial support for children who suffered traumatic experiences during the revolution.

Starting at the end of 2017, PSES provided course materials to Al-Hanaya which permitted it to expand its job training courses for both women and men. It also supported children impacted by the conflict through English, computer, and calligraphy courses and psychosocial support. These courses not only

serve citizens on both sides of the conflict, but also serve internally displaced Libyans who are in Bani Walid. With PSES support, Al-Hanaya's lead psychologist trained 12 other psychologists to assist children who were affected by the conflict.

PSES supported Al-Hanaya Center to train 1,060 people (men, women, and children) in 12 disciplines through 51 courses/activities held from January 2018 through September 2018. The table below reflects the breakdown by course:

Bani Walid Phase Three Engagement						
	Course Name	Number of Courses	Total Participants	Number of Septembrists	Number of Februarists	Number of Internally Displaced
1	Computer - Children	4	43	28	15	0
2	English - Children	6	72	45	26	1
3	English - Women	3	31	18	9	4
4	Nursing - Women	6	29	10	10	9
5	Nursing - Men	4	46	29	17	0
6	Dress Design - Women	5	78	49	27	2
7	Handicrafts - Women	5	123	72	47	4
8	Sewing - Women	6	107	70	33	4
9	Training of Psychosocial Support Staff	2	20	10	10	0
10	Psychosocial Support - Children	2	61	35	23	3
11	Group Activity - Children	5	322	186	120	16
12	Extra Classes - Children	3	128	85	39	4
TOTAL		51	1060	637	376	47




PHASE FOUR RESULTS

Discussion with Management: Al-Hanaya's management noted to PSES personnel that there are few educational opportunities for citizens in Bani Walid. Private groups that offer training in the city have a

reputation of seeking profits rather than developing people's skills and qualifications. The sector has not witnessed much development recently and there is no support from the state for further education.

The management team perceived PSES support to be limited, but it served their needs. In fact, it permitted the Center to introduce new services and attract more trainees. The team noted that the Center's most important challenge is its location, which is far from the city center and there are no regular transportation services. This means that many of the trainees come from the area surrounding the center. Al-Hanaya management noted the positive effect of PSES support by improving management and staff skills and abilities. The Center promotes its courses on social media. Former trainees are important in informing future trainees of the quality of its courses and its qualified staff. Trainees are encouraged by their families to take the courses.




As noted previously, the conflict in Bani Walid is ideological, not ethnic.

Throughout the course, most of the trainees participated in discussions and interactions with their peers and trainers, and some made friendships with peers that continued beyond the training sessions.

Effects on Trainees: The trainees who participated in the interviews and focus groups reported that they benefited from the activity in two ways: 1) they received high quality training that provided them with skills that they can use to find employment; and 2) the activity provided a neutral setting for them to meet and interact with those from the opposite side of the conflict.

Skills Development: Al Hanaya's management and staff claimed that the trainees routinely apply the skills and knowledge they acquired from the courses through opening businesses, partnering together, and participating in small-medium enterprise projects.

The trainees themselves were enthusiastic about the skills they acquired through the training. When asked about the future, they noted a variety of plans. Some wish to open new businesses based on the knowledge and experience they gained at the center. Others hope to take advanced studies, and still others aim to use this knowledge in their current jobs. Throughout the Phase Four interviews, participants highlighted the importance of the skills and information that they acquired through the courses, as well as new relationships formed while taking the courses.




Impact on Stability: The training courses provided a neutral setting for participants to interact with others from the opposing side of the conflict. The trainees said that “one of the benefits of the center is freedom.” The positive result was expressed by one trainee as “in Bani Walid we are all friends and family, and this is why interaction between us was more than excellent and I encouraged others to participate.” Staff also noted the positive effects of the Center’s work with PSES. The staff said that they feel good about dealing with trainees from different communities and “their families and close friends are proud of what they do.”

Many conflict resolution projects convene conferences or training sessions about conflict and techniques to management the conflict. The trainees and management noted that even though none of the courses dealt directly with conflict management, their participation at the center was seen “as a great way for bringing them (the two sides of the conflict) together”. Several trainees noted the indirect benefit of greater stability while developing their skills and abilities.


The courses also had an impact on the perception of women’s roles. The trainees, many of whom were women, noted that women have an economic role in Bani Walid and that they have a determination to achieve their goals. The trainees believe that women of Bani Walid have a prominent role in society which has been “further improved through offering them the resources that they’ve lacked.”

Throughout your experience with the course, have you dealt with individuals from an opposing community?




■ Yes ■ No


How comfortable is dealing with individuals from an opposing community?




Has your perception of the following changed after taking the course?



To what extent do you feel secure in your area?



How do perceive stability in the region compared to a year ago?



SEBHA

Phase Two research confirmed that the conflict in Sebha was primarily tribal with a political overlay. The two sides of the conflict are the Awlad Suleiman and Gadadfa tribes (Colonel Gadhafi is from the Gadadfa tribe). The conflict between these two tribes is not a hot conflict, although security in Sebha remains tenuous at best with frequent incidences of kidnapping, bombings and other acts of violence.


PSES' partner in Sebha was Um Momineen Civil Society (UMCS), a non-profit that has been working with women in Sebha for several years and has received prior international support. The main objective of UMCS is to provide training courses for women to provide them with the skills and knowledge needed to seek employment or to start their own businesses. Recently, the organization has taken on commercial activities as a means of funding its non-profit objectives. PSES saw this change as an opportunity to work with UMCS.

For the activity in Sebha, PSES funded training courses in professional sweets making, sewing, and dress making that targeted women from the two tribes. Women from the minority Tebu group were also included. PSES justified this activity and its targeting of women by noting that women in Sebha, and Libya generally, seek employment and business opportunities outside their homes in much greater numbers than before the revolution often because many are now solely responsible for family welfare. In addition to potentially starting their own businesses, the sweets produced during or after the training by the trainees could be sold in UMCS's sales outlet. The trainees paid a modest training fee to UMCS. There is demand for sweets making and dress making skills in Sebha and other parts of Libya. PSES leveraged that demand to sponsor courses that provided a platform for women on opposing sides of the conflict to work side by side toward a common economic goal. UMCS hired a social worker to ensure that cross-conflict interactions were positive.

PSES supported 6 professional development courses in Sebha—4 sweets making and 2 sewing courses—that trained a total of 172 women from August through November 2018. Of the total women trained, 31% were Gadadfa, 32% were Awlad Suleiman, and 37% were other ethnic groups. The table below reflects the breakdown by course:

Sebha Phase Three Engagement					
	Course Name	Total Participants	Number of Gadadfa	Number of Awlad Suleiman	Number of Other
1	Sweets - August	25	7	9	9
2	Sweets - September	28	8	9	11
3	Sweets - October	35	12	10	13
4	Sweets - November	25	10	7	8
5	Sewing - October	29	10	10	9
6	Sewing - November	30	6	10	14
	TOTAL	172	53	55	64

The chart below shows that the great majority of women who took the course were satisfied with the experience. The level of satisfaction was high for the overall experience (90 percent), for the trainers (80 percent), and the level of organizations and course content (both at 83 percent). Further, nearly 80 percent of the respondents to the Phase 4 survey said they would recommend taking a course at UMCS, and 100 percent said the course was extremely (97 percent) or somewhat (3 percent) useful. Ninety-seven percent of the respondents said that the courses were extremely relevant (67 percent) or somewhat relevant (30 percent) to their needs.



PHASE 4 RESULTS



The results of the PSES activity in Sebha has three inter-related components, the third of which aligns with the overall PSES objective of increasing stability through the private sector. First, the courses provided the trainees with tools to seek employment or establish a small business. The trainees noted that in practical terms, they expected the courses to assist them to raise their family incomes and prepare them for socially suitable jobs. Second, the courses also led to increasing the self-confidence of the trainees and heightened their ambition. With these courses, as in the past, UMCS focused on the changes in the mental health status of the trainees after they joined the labor market. The Center views development of self-confidence and improved mental health to be as important in acquiring practical, marketable skills. The trainees said that the courses they took at UMCS were an opportunity to acquire “job-creation skills that will result in their financial independence and make them stronger and bolder entrepreneurs who can meet new challenges.” They also noted that their friends and family encouraged them to enroll in the courses. One trainee explained, “I have changed in my brothers’ eyes as they became proud of me and have encouraged me take advanced courses and workshops in this field.”

Third, the courses increase stability by supporting the role of women in society and the local economy. According to the survey results, a large number of trainees believed that previously their role was limited, but now they believe that can play an active and positive role and that they are “a cornerstone of society.”

The trainees were between the ages of 30 to 55, and most came from the Awlad Suleiman, Gadadfa and Tebu tribes. The UMCS courses succeeded in bringing together women from the different tribes and helped to “achieve the concept of peaceful coexistence.” The head of UMCS said that the courses changed the perception of trainees noting while some of them had tribal conflicts, during the courses they all treated each other with respect. They cooperated with acceptance and “team spirit.”

The trainees and UMCS management said that the courses aided in forming relationships between the trainers and trainees which led to “harmony between them.” One trainee noted that the impact of the courses was to “convert the conflict from a ‘curse’ to a ‘blessing’” as it led to the reunification of the Awlad Suleiman, Gadadfa and Tebu tribes. Trainees generally expressed renewed comfort in dealing with members of other communities. According to one of them “we all live in the same city, under the same conditions, and suffer from the same things.”

The following chart shows that the course had a measurable impact on the attitude of the trainees on their perception of women’s role in society, the role of youth, and their attitude towards members of other communities. Nearly 100 percent of the respondents said that the courses changed their view of women’s role. Eighty-seven percent said their perceptions on other communities changed because of the course. But beyond changing perceptions, 57 percent of the trainees consider the courses to have succeeded in contributing to stability, dialogue and reunification, and of those, nearly 90 percent believe that the impact of the sessions will continue in the future.



The following statements are direct responses from the trainees in answering the question: **In what way would UMCS training course impact stability in the region?**

- Dealing with individuals from all tribes, especially the opposing side
- The information provided was helpful for stabilization
- End sensitivities between the tribes

- Integrate citizens into effective programs and solving disputes between youth
- Through meeting and dialoguing with all parties Through work and material provided to women Through the topics presented and their ability to strengthened stability
- Through advice and guidance and relations between the tribes even outside the center
- The center unifies people of all races and they get to interact with each other
- The center adopts the concept of accepting the other and this will spread and promote stability
- By empowering the role of women in society
- Psychological support and guidance for participants
- By integrating individuals into society
- Spread the spirit of cooperation and contribute to the building of social relations
- People's perceptions have changed because they are living the same conditions
- Unify people and gather them in one place

KUFRA

Kufra is an oasis in Libya's deep south, close to the border with Chad. It is the capital of the largest district in Libya. It is remote and is the only permanently populated area in the southeastern part of the district.

The conflict in Kufra, is most easily defined as non-nomadic Arabs (tribe Zway) against the Tebu, a traditionally nomadic people living in the border regions of Libya, Chad and northeastern Niger. Kufra District is sparsely populated, with about 50,000 residents. About 90 percent of the total are Arab, and ten percent Tebu. The conflict between the two sides predates the 2011 revolution by many decades. The Tebu political hardships became pronounced in 1987, when Libya and Chad clashed over control of the Aouzou Mountains, a strip of land in southern Libya and northern Chad. When the International Court of Justice gave the disputed territory to Chad, the Tebu residing in Aouzou, a few hundred families, became stateless, when the Libyan government withdrew their citizenship. Matters worsened considerably when two decades later in 2007, the Libyan Government declared that Libyan Tebu, even those born in Libya and with valid Libyan citizenship, would no longer have access to state-financed benefits. This included medical care, education, and other services administered by the state. The United Nations reported in 2010 that the Libyan Government was engaging in ethnic cleansing of the Tebu in Kufra.²

² Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human rights Council resolution 5/1: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. November 2010.

The PSES activity in Kufra focused on improving relations between the Zway and Tebu to bring about greater stability in the district. After considering six potential activities, PSES chose to work with a farmer to develop three hectares of land in an area that borders both Zway and Tebu areas. The activity design was to assist the farmer with the installation of an irrigation system, the construction of a small rest house for workers, and the construction of a small lined irrigation reservoir, all of which were achieved during the project lifetime. In return for the support in building up his farm, the farmer agreed to hire both Zway and Tebu workers for the construction works and the production of crops. The activity design was rooted in the concept of contact theory of resolution—if the Tebu and Zway had a place to routinely interact to achieve a common goal, perhaps this would lead to improved relations between the individuals from two tribes and, hopefully, for this improvement to spread through their networks to a wider group of people.

After signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining the farm development and production plan and the required procurement in March 2018, the activity faced delays due to procurement. The majority of the items had to be purchased in Tripoli and shipped to Kufra, and Kufra experienced weeks-long periods when roads were blocked. It was isolated from other cities in Libya due the marginally passable road from Tripoli to Kufra and to renewed fighting along the way and in or near the city. Further, there were kidnappings in the area surrounding the farm which prevented the Tebu workers from working as planned with him and the other Zway workers.

Although the activity eventually took off and the farm did produce crops and engage both Tebu and Zway workers as designed, the farmer voiced significant frustration over the delays. He was also disturbed that, contrary to his original understanding, PSES was unable to supply seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and a generator that would keep the irrigation pumps running when power outages occurred.

Notwithstanding these disappointments, development of the farm brought together Zway and Tebu workers, though perhaps not on the scale PSES and the farmer anticipated. The Tebu worked on the farm when they felt safe to travel to it from their homes, and the farmer fully intends to hire more Tebu in the future. The farm has produced a diverse set of crops, mainly vegetable crops, but also sugar cane. Due to a lack of marketing channels for the perishables, the farmer gave much of the produce to the Tebu. In the coming years, he will use this land for other crops, grains such as wheat or barley, and alfalfa for animal feed.

BENGHAZI

The conflict in Benghazi is more difficult to describe. It started as primarily sectarian but evolved into a larger conflict that engulfed most of the city. The conflict had many Islamic militias, of varying ideological affiliations, battling each other and the Libyan National Army (LNA), headed by General Khalifa Hefar. Often the conflict pitted neighborhood against neighborhood, with no clear geographic lines of conflict. It ended when General Hefar and the LNA won by subduing the militias and taking full control of the city. While tensions remain in some areas in and around the city, Benghazi should be considered pacified, though perhaps not entirely at peace.

In the aftermath of this chaos, PSES chose to work with a well-known and apolitical private partner, Amazonat. Amazonat is a women-owned NGO that prepares women and men in Benghazi to enter the workforce and contribute to greater stability in the city. It provides training courses to women that focus on: designing and tailoring clothes; knitting; and decorating handicrafts. These courses prepare women to become self-employed entrepreneurs in cottage industries that have demand in post-war Benghazi; or they may be able to gain employment with existing companies in these industries. PSES contributed materials for the courses.

PHASE FOUR RESULTS

The description of the results of the activity are based on two interviews with: 1) the manager of Amazonat; and 2) the trainers of one of the three courses. The transcript of the interview with the manager of Amazonat is presented as an Annex to this assessment. During the time of this assessment, only one of the three courses PSES supported had started, and was still on-going. This made it very difficult to reach a conclusive evaluation of the impact of this activity.

According to the local partner, this training had a low turnout; while workshops like this would normally attract up to 20 students, this course had only eight participants. She explained that this low turnout can be attributed to:

1. **The timing of the training:** summer time is the season which attracts the most number of trainees, perhaps since female students on summer holidays would have the time to take the class. “I believe that if we worked during the summer we would have been able to target more women,” she claimed.
2. **Transport:** a lot of the women in Benghazi—and Libya at large—cannot or do not have the means to drive. Therefore, transport is a major factor to consider for anyone contemplating the idea of joining this, or any other, course. This meant that they would either rely on male relatives to drive them, or to pay for transport; the latter is especially costly for those with limited financial means.
3. **Lack of advertisement:** advertising for classes in a big city like Benghazi needs both time and finance, something the local partner lacked.

As for the eight students who were undergoing the training at the time of this report, things seem to be going smoothly. The trainer says that “so far it's been going well. What they have managed to do so far is good.” Also, from the standpoint of women empowerment, this training appears to be a positive tool helping build the capacity of women who seek employment in sewing and tailoring.

As it has been clear from the beginning, Benghazi's conflict is different in nature than others in the country; most of those who live in the city are past the war period and are already moving forward. It was not immediately possible for us to determine the political affiliation of any of the eight trainees, especially since Amazonat did not interview or ask participants about their political affiliation, and rather kept an open door for anyone. “We do not discriminate here as we are a neutral organization,” the head of Amazonat explained.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

With PSES' mandated research focus that would inform future Libya programming, knowledge management was a priority from the outset. The following section analyzes PSES' approach to knowledge management and associated challenges.

PHASE TWO – DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

Knowledge management began in earnest during Phase Two when PSES engaged two Libyan subcontractors—Diwan and the Sadeq Institute—to carry out the community research on which the pilot intervention strategies were to be based. The firms developed questionnaires and guides for interviews and focus group discussions which were reviewed by the DAI and USAID team and then by the CEOs.

The review process took considerable time and research began later than planned in January 2017 in Ghadames/Awal. Despite delays caused by security challenges and communications problems – frequent power cuts and internet outages that delayed researchers getting to their communities and then getting their data back to processing areas in Tripoli –Phase Two research concluded in January 2018.

The products of Phase Two research were five quantitative reports submitted as Power-Point slide decks and five reports summarizing the qualitative findings (one each per community). After review, comments all suggested that the initial reports were simply too long and detailed. To address this, the team prepared summaries of the two reports that integrated the findings into one succinct document per community that were submitted to USAID between May 2017 and January 2018. They were shared within USAID and are attached as an Annex to this report along with the other PSES deliverables. The intended audience of these reports was USAID, other Libya implementing partners, and the PSES team to better design pilot private sector engagements.

PSES did use the research reports to guide discussions with Libyan counterparts as they met partners and discussed potential interventions for Phase Three of PSES. However, after several Phase Four interviews with people who had received the reports, it was concluded that the conflict situation in most Libyan communities is very specific to each community and is constantly changing as militias and community leaders change sides and opinions. This meant that the Phase Two data was unlikely to be useful beyond the immediate few months following its conclusion. The Phase Two research served a clear purpose at during the early stages of PSES Phase Three implementation, but the question remains whether it was worth the time and expense invested in collecting such extensive and detailed data.

Although the research did not grasp a wider audience, the following analyzes the utility of the research during Phase Three.

RESEARCH IMPACT ON PHASE THREE

Although not as useful to a wider audience, the research did help with the preparation and implementation of Phase Three in several ways:

- By asking the CEOs to review and edit the qualitative and quantitative survey instruments before the researchers applied them, PSES ensured that the CEOs knew what information would be

assembled in the reports. This helped the CEOs get a very clear idea of the purpose and methodology of PSES.

- The CEOs were in regular contact with the survey teams during data collection and thus were engaged in the progress of the project and initial results. The exception to this was in Sebha where the first CEO resigned to take a longer-term job with a different USAID-funded project. In this case, the research reports also served to orient the replacement CEO.
- The variety of potential projects chosen by the CEOs in each community and the analysis they provided to enable DAI and USAID to choose the best possible intervention partners from among those available showed their understanding of the conflict dynamics as reflected in the research findings.
- The Libya-based Project Manager noted that if PSES had carried out the qualitative research first and then followed it with quantitative surveys to test the information gathered and guide the team to better understanding of how to work in these communities, the Phase Two research would be more useful.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PSES carried out an extensive program of qualitative and quantitative research on the five communities selected for the project's pilot interventions. The 13 months and \$ [REDACTED] invested in Phase Two subcontractors Diwan and Sadeq produced qualitative reports and quantitative slide decks, which did not attract a very wide audience. There was general agreement that the short (10-12 page) summaries of the research in each community that combined quantitative and qualitative results were the most accessible and thus the most useful documents prepared under Phase Two.

PSES used a combination of surveys, key informant interviews, and reporting from the field to test the validity of PSES hypotheses and offer a final assessment of the lessons learned from both the research and the interventions carried out by PSES. The intention of the final summary of data and lessons learned included in this report is to guide future USAID policy and program decisions about work in Libya. It is also intended to help implementers work successfully in the challenging and high-potential environment of the country. The main sources of information were:

- The somewhat regular weekly reporting from the CEOs provided an on-going account of the efforts to launch and then implement interventions meant to work with the private sector to increase contacts and thus understanding across conflict lines. Most of these reports were submitted in Arabic (Kufra, Bani Walid, Ghadames), but Benghazi and Sebha generally reported in English. They were typically Google translated to inform non-Arabic speaking members of the team.
- Each CEO provided the Libya-based Project Manager with a final report summarizing the process and the initial results of the interventions.
- PSES collected basic data about the interventions – number of beneficiaries and their affiliation, courses offered and numbers of participants, anecdotal data about attitudes and responses to the courses, etc.
- Phase Four follow-up qualitative and quantitative data that focused on activity impact and perceptions of direct and indirect beneficiaries of PSES work. In the communities where PSES work was handicapped by delays and logistical difficulties (Kufra and Benghazi), the project engaged a consultant to conduct telephonic interviews with participants and key informants as

well as beneficiaries. In the other three communities, Diwan conducted qualitative and quantitative surveying and focus groups of beneficiaries.


CREATIVE MANAGEMENT

In addition to being experimental in technical terms, PSES was also experimental operationally speaking. The project's objective was to test a set of hypotheses on the potential role of the private sector to promote stability in Libya, something that had not been tried in previous conflict resolution or stability projects. PSES also intended to do this with a streamlined management structure that was drastically different from other USAID programs. The management structure was fleshed out during project Phase One – Project Design, the first three months of the project.

During Phase One, PSES drafted the Year One workplan that introduced the proposed management structure. The structure had two complementary teams – one based in Libya and the one based in DAI's home office in Bethesda, Maryland. Although the workplan was a living document that had the flexibility to evolve according to project needs, it made it clear that the management structure would be light and Libyan-led. The theory behind the light touch was that it would afford greater flexibility and decision-making on the ground in the communities that were soon to be selected. The CEOs would be supported by the management structure as needed, but were otherwise empowered to design, implement, and assess the PSES activities.

The structure was designed to operate in Libya instead of relying on offices and staff in Tunisia. This would reduce operational costs and demonstrate that the project was Libyan-led. The CEOs were selected specifically for their knowledge and networks within their communities and neutrality so that they would be viewed by potential private sector partners as trustworthy. With such localized conflicts, the project relied heavily on this decentralized structure to determine how to best intervene and collaborate with the private sector. Although the light management footprint empowered the CEOs and ensured that activities fit the local context, a management presence in Tunis could have improved intra-team communication and knowledge sharing which will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion and recommendations section to come.

PSES Organizational Chart



Once the team identified the Libyan Project Manager (based in Tripoli) and the five PSES communities were selected, the Project Manager identified and recruited the CEOs. From a CEO training in April 2017 through the end of Phase Three, the Libyan Project Manager led a team of seven: five Community Engagement Officer (CEO) (one for each of the five communities); a data integration consultant based in Tripoli; and an Operations Manager consultant also based in Tripoli. This part of the team assessed potential partners, designed activity proposals, and implemented the selected activities in close coordination with the selected private sector entity. At the end of the project, all team members agreed that the decentralized structure achieved its goal of empowering local staff to make decisions and determine the best methods of engagement in each community.

The Libyan team was supported from Bethesda by a part-time Chief of Party, a Knowledge Management Specialist, and Technical Advisor. In addition, the team in Bethesda had a Project Team Director, Project Manager, and Associate, three positions in DAI's normal management configuration to support USAID projects. This part of the team reviewed activity proposals and provided recommendations to USAID, ensured compliance with USAID and DAI regulations, and shaped the strategic direction of the project.

Once the team was built, the US portion of the team held weekly (or more frequent) calls with the Libyan Project Manager. The Project Manager and the US team also communicated on an ad hoc basis when needed. The inconsistent internet connection in Libya often made communications difficult. This led to the project team holding calls outside of normally scheduled times to not impede project progress. The Project Manager communicated all information and decisions resulting from these conversations directly to the CEOs. Throughout Phase Three, when project activities were most intense, the Libyan Project Manager would check in with each CEO daily.

The team also held three all-staff meetings in Tunis—the initial CEO Training when the CEOs were first identified in April 2017, Programmatic Pause One in September 2017, and Programmatic Pause Two in April 2018. Given the decentralized and virtual nature of the team, these three meetings were critical points to ensure team cohesiveness and that all members of the team had a common understand of

expectations. Given that the CEOs were operating alone in their communities, it was important to establish links with the rest of the team and reinforce the overall goal of PSES. It also served as an opportunity for the Bethesda part of the team and USAID to gain a better grasp of the events and environment on the ground in each community.

Although these meetings served as a good starting point for building team cohesion and looping in the Bethesda part of the team, it would have benefited the program if these meetings occurred once a quarter rather than spread out throughout the program. It would have also benefited the project to use more of the meeting time to re-emphasize the PSES hypotheses and project goals and talk through any technical and operational challenges. Each meeting had a defined agenda for each day, but the bulk of each meeting consisted of CEO read outs of the political and social context in their communities. Although this was helpful context, a lot of the context could have been read through in advance instead of presented in-person. The ad hoc discussions on the last day of the meeting (when nothing was scheduled) were arguably the most helpful to the program. It would have benefited the program for these meetings to be less formalized and more of a chance for team members to work together on brainstorming lessons learned, coming up with solutions to challenges, talking through partner expectations and capability, and completing programmatic learning exercises. For future meetings, PSES recommends sending out targeted analysis questions to team members so that they can come prepared as it is critical due to the limited amount of in-person time the team has.

CHALLENGES

Due to the complexity of the project objectives and operating environment and as expected with an experimental program, the team experienced several management challenges both at the project and activity level. The project objectives were complex primarily due to their experimental nature and the fact the PSES was testing non-traditional methods to improve stability. The operating environment added additional complexity since movement in Libya was limited, security concerns were high, the market was volatile, and the financial landscape was opaque.

Communications and Knowledge Management: At the project level, and as previously discussed in the knowledge management section, communications and knowledge capture were difficult. This was perhaps the most challenging feature of the project. The CEOs lived and worked in remote parts of Libya and they were often the sole people that had access to PSES partners. Frequent power outages also made it difficult to capture project knowledge in an organized or routine manner. CEOs produced ad hoc reports, but there was no one in Libya to consolidate and analyze the information and routinely relate activity developments back to the larger PSES objectives. This left the Bethesda part of the team to review reports on a rolling basis, trying to cobble together themes and links across the reports to tell the complete story in each community. Even when the Bethesda part of the team sent follow up questions, it often took many attempts to get the desired information. To mitigate this, the Bethesda part of the team would aggregate all questions into one email so that the Libyan Project Manager could follow up with each CEO by phone. This and contacting the CEOs directly improved communications, but it would have been most effective to have a Knowledge Management Specialist in country. An in-country specialist could have visited the communities, spoken to the CEOs in Arabic, and continually reminded the CEOs of the PSES hypotheses and how progress in each community was to be tracked.

Operations and Procurement: PSES faced procurement challenges. The Operations Manager conducted most procurements from Tripoli on behalf of the CEOs because the required equipment was usually not available locally in the communities. Since much of the PSES equipment and materials were

highly specialized (medical supplies, irrigation equipment), confirmation of the specifications and transportation of the materials took time. Some of the delays were a result of insecure roads. Lack of experience with USAID procurement regulations requiring long distance explanations from the Bethesda-based team to the Operations Manager and CEOs also contributed to delays. Despite these delays and the few PSES procurements that required Libyan companies to import specific goods, the team reflected that it was most efficient to procure items within Libya. This was facilitated by the team's decision to run project finances through the Libyan Project Manager, allowing him the flexibility to make payments to vendors as needs arose.

Activity-Level: At the activity level, the CEOs served as the main—and often only—PSES point of contact for the PSES private sector partners. Although this empowered the CEOs, it meant that it was up to each individual CEO to set and manage the expectations of the partners with little guidance or oversight. Without a noticeable PSES presence in the community other than the CEO himself, some of the CEOs expressed that it was difficult to come off as credible when first soliciting partners. The team addressed part of this challenge by organizing for the CEOs to meet with each other and the Libyan Project Manager in Tripoli from time to time. These meetings served as needed touch points to regroup and to share experiences with success and challenges in the communities. Despite the challenges associated with having an individual CEO operate in each community, it ultimately allowed the presence of PSES to be tailored to fit the needs in each community.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PSES was innovative in the sense that it was able to implement a diverse array of activities in five geographically separate communities with a very limited budget. The lean management structure that was designed during the co-creation process and fleshed out during Phase One (Project Design) once the award had been made and the team started to assemble, allowed the project to conserve operational costs and emphasize local leadership of the project. During Phase One, the Bethesda team at the time quickly interviewed and identified the Libyan Project Manager who in turn helped create the concept of the CEO position. From the start of the project, it was envisioned that the CEOs would take ownership of activity design and implementation which played a role in encouraging private sector actors to work across conflict lines. After receiving initial training on the project and its objectives at the CEO training in Tunis, the CEOs were constantly empowered by the Libyan Project Manager who served as the interface between the CEOs and the Bethesda team. The Libyan Project Manager helped the CEOs design their activities with PSES objectives in mind.

When considering lessons learned throughout the program, the team concluded that dedicating more resources to consolidating project knowledge would have been extremely beneficial to the project. It could have also been beneficial for the entire team to have direct communications with each other rather than go through multiple layers. This would have eliminated misunderstandings and led to quicker response times. For future programming, this could mean basing at least one international management staff in Tunis. Having a team member in Tunis to help consolidate and analyze CEO findings could have led to better organized project learning and easier follow up with CEOs and partners. Due to the part-time and remote nature of the Bethesda part of the team, the team could have benefited from having someone in Tunis that could more easily and more frequently meet with Libyan counterparts. That presence could have also been more 'tangible' for the CEOs and serve as a readily accessible face of the project.

Although the program had a limited budget, the team would have also benefited from more frequent all-staff meetings to discuss findings and refine approaches. Due to the remoteness of the team members

spread across Libya, this could have been addressed through investing in virtual team communication technology such as video platforms. It is important to note, however, that this would necessitate considering alternate sources of power given the frequent outages in the communities.

Finally, regarding incorporating new partners in Libya, it would benefit future programs to be explicit and clear with setting timelines and expectations up front and being proactive about communicating any possible changes as far in advance as possible. PSES noted that in some communities, the reports coming through did not show any sign of issues with managing partners, but further analysis conducted in Phase Four revealed that some of the partners felt that communications could have been improved.

ANNEX A – PSES SUBCONTRACTORS

Diwan Marketing Research (Phases One, Two, and Four): Diwan Marketing Research has been the leading provider of public opinion polling in Libya since 2011, having worked for such organizations as Gallup, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Diwan has widespread capacity to conduct household surveys, one-on-one interviews, focus-group interviews, telephone and electronic polling across the country. Diwan led the private sector quantitative surveying in PSES Phase Two and the Phase Four follow up qualitative and quantitative research for the Sebha, Ghadames One, and Bani Walid activities. The total Phase One and Two budget was \$[REDACTED]. The total Phase Four budget was \$[REDACTED].

Sadeq Institute (Phases One and Two): The Sadeq Institute is Libya’s first public-policy think tank, a leading provider of qualitative policy research and analysis in the fields of security and service delivery, as well as economic and institutional reform. Sadeq led the qualitative analyses conducted in PSES Phase Two and produced the conflict actor mapping reports and qualitative data. The total Phase One and Two budget was \$[REDACTED].

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1. Phase Two Qualitative and Quantitative Reports – Ghadames/Awal/Dirj
2. Summary of Phase Two Findings – Ghadames/Awal/Dirj
3. Phase Two Qualitative and Quantitative Reports – Bani Walid
4. Summary of Phase Two Findings – Bani Walid
5. Phase Two Qualitative and Quantitative Reports – Benghazi
6. Summary of Phase Two Findings – Benghazi
7. Phase Two Qualitative and Quantitative Reports – Kufra
8. Summary of Phase Two Findings – Kufra
9. Phase Two Qualitative and Quantitative Reports – Sebha
10. Summary of Phase Two Findings – Sebha
11. Quarterly Reports x7 (Oct – Dec 2016; Jan-Mar 2017; Apr-Jun 2017; Oct-Dec 2017; Jan-Mar 2018; Apr-Jun 2018; Jul-Sept 2018)
12. Year One Annual Report (September 2017 – September 2018)
13. Spotlight Stories – Ghadames and Bani Walid
14. PSES Kick Off Meeting in Tunis – December 2016
15. CEO Training – April 2017
16. Programmatic Pause One – September 2017
17. Programmatic Pause Two – April 2018

ANNEX C – PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Position Title

Chief of Party/Lead Analyst
Project Team Director/Chief of Party
Knowledge Management Specialist/Research Analyst
Senior Advisor
Project Manager (September 2012 – December 2017)
Project Manager (February 2018 – September 2018)
Project Associate
Lead Analyst
Project Manager (Tripoli Based)
Community Engagement Officer - Ghadames
Community Engagement Officer – Bani Walid
Community Engagement Officer - Benghazi
Community Engagement Officer - Kufra
Community Engagement Officer – Sebha
Data Integration Consultant
Senior Operations Manager
Training Support Officer/Research Consultant/Research Analyst-Benghazi/Phase Four Qualitative Researcher
Libya Economic Research Support Consultant
Operations Specialist
Management Information System Specialist

Benghazi Mapping Consultant
Principal Editor – Publications
Global Practice Specialist/AMEP Consultant
Mapping Consultant
CEO Training Advisor
Libya Economic Consultant
Libya Academic Consultant
Mapping Consultant

ANNEX D – SUCCESS STORIES

FINDING COMMON GROUND THROUGH BASIC HEALTH SERVICE PROVISION

The USAID-funded Private Sector Engagement for Stability (PSES) Project works in Libyan communities that have suffered widespread conflict since the uprising against the Gaddafi regime in February 2011. The PSES hypothesis is that shared economic interests can bring the sides of the conflict to work together to realize increased mutual benefit and thus contribute to stable relationships. PSES selected five diverse communities throughout Libya (Ghadames/Awal/Dirj, Bani Walid, Kufra, Sebha, and Benghazi), each with a different dimensions and histories of conflict in which to: first, conduct quantitative and qualitative research about the private sector and conflicts which have impeded their efforts to increase their economic activity; and second, implement specific activities to bring elements of the community together to generate economic and social benefits. Over the past several months, PSES has been implementing its first activity in Ghadames/Awal/Dirj.

Through the expansion of basic dental and medical care, PSES strives to increase collaboration and trust between Arab and/or Amazigh communities in Ghadames and Tuareg communities in Dirj. By March 2018, PSES had provided over \$[REDACTED] in essential consumable supplies to a medical clinic in Ghadames and dental clinic in Dirj that has allowed the clinics to see an increased number of patients. More importantly, it has facilitated a referral network between the Ghadames doctors and Dirj dentists that is blind to conflict lines. Since PSES formed the relationship between the clinics and provided the consumable supplies, a diverse group of 530 people has been treated and waiting rooms have become a mix of Tuareg, Arab, and Amazigh.



A Tuareg dentist attends to a student patient. With support of the PSES program, the dentist is increasing access to basic dental services for both Tuareg and Arab populations.

Regarding the community reaction to this partnership, PSES Ghadames-Awal-Dirj Community Engagement Officer (CEO) remarked: “The head of the Tuareg tribe in the region has welcomed the idea that the project promotes peace in the whole region... specifically [through the private sector]. For decades, [he said], no one has supported the vital private sector and PSES is the first on the ground [to do so].”

PSES is in the process of furthering its work in Ghadames-Awal-Dirj by providing updated medical and dental equipment that will cut down on clinic costs and allow the doctors and dentists to see even more patients at lower costs.

OVERCOMING IDEOLOGY IN BANI WALID

The USAID-funded Private Sector Engagement for Stability (PSES) Project works in Libyan communities that have witnessed widespread conflict since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The foundation of PSES is a set of hypotheses that posit that private sector engagement of two sides of a conflict can help to bring stability. Since January 2018, PSES has been implementing its first activity in Bani Walid to test the hypotheses about the private sector’s role in conflict settings.

To inform the ongoing activity, PSES conducted intensive qualitative and quantitative research throughout 2017 and found that conflict in Bani Walid is largely ideological; citizens are all from the same tribe, but there are those who opposed the 2011 revolution (Septembrists) and those who supported it (Februarists). The city experienced violence between the two groups during the revolution, but in recent years, the city has remained relatively calm. Although PSES found that this ideological divide incites apprehension and anxiety, it now has little impact on most citizens’ feeling of security and most businesses surveyed saw a clear advantage in working with businesses that hold differing political views. Despite this, opposing sides of the private sector lack basic trust in each other.

To address this, PSES works with Al Hanaya Center, a women-owned private company aimed at providing conflict-neutral job training and psychosocial support courses to Bani Walid residents. By providing course materials, PSES has allowed Al Hanaya to expand its job training courses for women and men (nursing, handicrafts, sewing, clothing design, English, and IT) and bring children impacted by the conflict together through English, computer, and calligraphy courses and psychosocial support. These

courses not only serve citizens on both sides of the conflict, but also serve internally displaced Libyans who are now in Bani Walid.

By May 2018, more than 65 children (ages 5-12) from families with opposing political views have participated in monthly festivals that include intellectual, drawing, and singing competitions. Local news sources such as Akbhar Al-Bilaad have featured such festivals. PSES has also helped Al Hanaya expand its psychological support offerings for children as the lead local psychologist has trained 10 councilors to interact with the children affected by the conflict.



On the left, high performing college graduates take training courses in psychological support. On the right, nursing students begin their courses; they will be certified by the government to work in private and public health institutions.

For adult men and women, PSES has supported Hanaya with the training of 47 women in sewing, 56 women in handicrafts, 27 women in clothing design, and 130 men and women in nursing at the time of reporting. Among these trainees, there are about 13 internally displaced people (IDPs) and nearly a 50/50 split between Septembrists and Februarists.

ANNEX D – PARTNER INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT – BENGHAZI

Q: Can you tell me about the project, and how it came about? What are the targets, etc?

A: [The CEO] reached out to us through ACTED. We are specialized in giving workshops to help empower women. Amazonat Libya is an organization for raising awareness and we work on women empowerment, so with that in mind, he asked us to think of a project in which he could help.

So, I thought that economic empowerment for women is very important, especially that his organization is interested in stabilization of families through the private sector. So, our goals actually meet, and we presented him with our vision. We were thinking to include computer related workshops, but it seems that there wasn't enough funding for that, so we cancelled or postponed it. I am not sure.

We also thought about giving workshops to train women on travel booking, to provide trainings on flight booking software, because there are good job opportunities in that field. We also give sewing workshops and arts, etc. So that happened a long time ago, and I did tell [the CEO] that time is crucial, and that summer time is the best time because turnouts are much higher in the summer workshops, because we can also target female students who are on summer breaks. So, I don't know what circumstances are behind the delay in funding, but we only managed to get it going recently.

We started by doing ad campaigns, but as you know that we have this problem in Libyan society, which is the way that they view any organization through the lens of charity. Any civil society organization = charitable organization. So, when people approach us they are somehow expecting a handout. They would ask "how much would you give us if we attend?" So, this has been a problem. The way we approached this is to first give consultations through our social counselling office and talk each woman through the reasons why financial empowerment is very important, etc. so what I am trying to say is that the turnout for this activity/training was not that high.

There are a number of factors that contributed to this: there is the problem of transport, for those who do not have anybody to drive them, they have to use female operated taxis which are not cheap. They cost about 20 LYD per trip. So, if one woman who is not financially well off tries to attend 4 times a week, imagine how much she would spend on just transport. I always say that to our main donor (the UN development fund) that if we really do want to help empower women, we must find a way to help them with this transportation issue, so they can attend our workshops.

Q: This is a problem. Can you be more specific on what the training is in this case? I understand that its sewing?

Yes, we started with this. Our main trainer is sick in Jordan, so we are using somebody else who is also good. The women are learning, but the problem is that the numbers/turnout of students are not what we expected. I believe that if we worked during the summer we would have been able to target more women.

Q: Ok, can you tell me more about this phase. You chose sewing classes as the kind of training that is needed to empower women, right?

Yes, crochet and decorative arts for handicraft production and sales. And honestly, there isn't one thing that we asked for that [the CEO] didn't provide.

Q: Great, also that I understand correctly, that once he provided you with the materials you started. Which was a couple of weeks ago, right?

The crochet we started because we had no problems in that department. I think that we are almost going to graduate a group, because the training is a month and a half.

Q: Ok and now you have been giving them training for more than 2-3 weeks?

Yeah, correct.

Q: Can you tell me more on how many students are being trained? How many did you anticipate?

Yes, the way this works is that 12, for instance, would enroll, but only 5 would actually show up. Because, as I told you, the issue of transport. Also, we have enrolment fees that you can consider very modest compared to other private learning centers. Also, as we agreed with [the CEO], he (PSES) are not going to pay for the teacher. Which is understandable, the most important thing for us was the materials which you guys provided. Materials are very expensive and that's always a problem for me whenever we have training.

Anyways, now that we have the materials, this workshop has about 8 participants. We normally need a class of at least 20, but we only got 8. There was a group that enrolled at first then pulled back when the main teacher couldn't do it because of health reasons. So, they will wait until she returns. And that is their choice which I respect.

Now this current teacher is with all honesty an excellent teacher.

I wanted to also target women from the outskirts of the city, which I believe the most who need such a program, but I can't because of transport issues. I found schools that could provide the space, but I still have the issue of transport. We also have a problem of finding trainers. One time we got a trainer who graduated as a professional tailor from a vocational training school, but who knows nothing about tailoring. She ruined a lot of our materials.

This is a real problem in Libya. I got a lot of women who are IT graduates who are looking for work. I'd connect them with local companies who need people to type, and they turn out not to know anything about computers. It's a real problem here. So that's primarily why I am working on providing training to women, because certificates in Libya mean nothing. Also, it is important that the workshops are not for free.

Q: ok, can we speak more about this ongoing training you have, the one that started three weeks ago? This one participants have to pay a symbolic fee?

Yeah, the crochet training costs each of them about 50 LYD and sewing /tailoring is 75 LYD.

Q: Can you talk to me more about the students, type of people, are they? What is their background? As you know the purpose of this project is to target everyone in this post war period and not exclude anyone.

Of course, we do not discriminate here as we are a neutral organization. In our psychological support program/office, we receive everyone from the mothers of ISIS members to the mothers of LNA members. So many stories we hear, so many tragedies in those families. We have a program to support the families of martyrs; we take them to trips together despite the different backgrounds. We have February people, Karama folks, and there are also those who even love Gaddafi supporters.

Q; Great, that's what I'd like to hear. What I am most interested in is this training in particular, can you tell me more about the participants? Do you know anything about their political affiliation? Especially after 3 weeks, do you know much about them?

No, they are just simple ladies, we know that they live within their simple means, but we don't really know their affiliation.

Q: Did they know each other before?

I am not really sure, I just know that two of them hired a car together to come to the workshop, but I don't know if they knew each other from before. It's often the case that people meet here and they become friends even after the workshop is over.

Q: Do you know what families they come from and which areas? Do you have any more info?

I can't say, I only come to greet them from one time to another.

Q: Ok, I understand that as a director of that center you won't really have everyday interactions with them, at least not as much and the trainer. Is there a chance that I can speak to the trainer?

Naturally, she is the one who is closer to them. I don't have her number here on me, but I can set it up. This is a really good project, but as you can see it is going a little bit slowly. As I told you earlier, I was pretty stoked about the summer season because of the number of potential participants, but we are going forward with the project regardless.

Q: Can you give me some pointers on what could have gone better to speed things up? Not necessarily to criticize but to help them understand the lessons learned in this project.

As I said, it is not a criticism, but for future projects, they have to allow for at least a 4-5-month planning period before the intended start date of the project, so they can make sure that things go smoothly. For example, you can't ask me to train 120 women in the 3-month duration. Also, there should be some marginal budget for unexpected things such as transportation. We could have used the transport money to empower more women as an indirect beneficiary. We can hire female drivers to do the transport.

Q: Do you think it's fair to say that results are still not clear for this project?

Absolutely, there are no clear results yet. Also, the number of trainees is only eight which is not a good number to help us judge any results